The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany 1944-45

by Ian Kershaw

From the preeminent Hitler biographer, a fascinating and original exploration of how the Third Reich was willing and able to fight to the bitter end of World War II.
Countless books have been written about why Nazi Germany lost World War II, yet remarkably little attention has been paid to the equally vital question of how and why it was able to hold out as long as it did. The Third Reich did not surrender until Germany had been left in ruins and almost completely occupied. Even in the near-apocalyptic final months, when the war was plainly lost, the Nazis refused to sue for peace. Historically, this is extremely rare.

Drawing on original testimony from ordinary Germans and arch-Nazis alike, award-winning historian Ian Kershaw explores this fascinating question in a gripping and focused narrative that begins with the failed bomb plot in July 1944 and ends with the German capitulation in May 1945. Hitler, desperate to avoid a repeat of the "disgraceful" German surrender in 1918, was of course critical to the Third Reich's fanatical determination, but his power was sustained only because those below him were unable, or unwilling, to challenge it. Even as the military situation grew increasingly hopeless, Wehrmacht generals fought on, their orders largely obeyed, and the regime continued its ruthless persecution of Jews, prisoners, and foreign workers. Beneath the hail of allied bombing, German society maintained some semblance of normalcy in the very last months of the war. The Berlin Philharmonic even performed on April 12, 1945, less than three weeks before Hitler's suicide.

As Kershaw shows, the structure of Hitler's "charismatic rule" created a powerful negative bond between him and the Nazi leadership- they had no future without him, and so their fates were inextricably tied. Terror also helped the Third Reich maintain its grip on power as the regime began to wage war not only on its ideologically defined enemies but also on the German people themselves. Yet even as each month brought fresh horrors for civilians, popular support for the regime remained linked to a patriotic support of Germany and a terrible fear of the enemy closing in.

Based on prodigious new research, Kershaw's The End is a harrowing yet enthralling portrait of the Third Reich in its last desperate gasps.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, War, Germany, Military History, Politics

592 pages, Hardcover

First published September 8, 2011

About the author

Ian Kershaw is a British historian, noted for his biographies of Adolf Hitler.
Ian Kershaw studied at Liverpool (BA) and Oxford (D. Phil). He was a lecturer first in medieval, then in modern, history at the University of Manchester. In 1983-4 he was Visiting Professor of Modern History at the Ruhr University in Bochum, West Germany. From 1987 to 1989 he was Professor of Modern History at the University of Nottingham, and since 1989 has been Professor of Modern History at Sheffield. He is a fellow of the British Academy, of the Royal Historical Society, of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, and of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung in Bonn. He retired from academic life in the autumn semester of 2008.

Reviews

[Paul Bryant · Rating 3 out of 5]

These 400 pages are like a single chord with six notes, horror, terror, death, pain, ruin and obedience. You will have observed the absence of pity and mercy. I wonder whether we – I – read this account of the last year of the Third Reich in the spirit of revenge, in some distant vicarious sense, because this is where the Nazis finally got what was coming to them. So it could be the one to read straight after Hitler's Willing Executioners or a viewing of Claude Lanzmann's documentary Shoah. And who wouldn't wish those perpetrators to suffer. And suffer they did, especially the ones who didn't die quickly.

The End is simply a catalogue of German torment. It's amazingly repetitive. Here's a core sample - some phrases, adverbs and adjectives from three random pages:

P 150 : raging inferno; misery of the population; deprived of all amenities; primitive conditions; little more than holes in the ground; grim-faced; bitter cold; contempt; delusion; starting to flake; crisis in confidence; failed

P250: no heroic defence; desperate refugees; wounded civilians; broken, then crushed; 143,000 officers and men killed, wounded or missing; battered forces

P350 : the misery; so cowardly; like sheep to the slaughter; hatred is blazing; increasingly desperate fight; process of liquidation; a futile aim

You could take a similar sample from any three other pages and get the same result. It becomes numbing. I wonder how Ian Kershaw could have dragged himself through the writing of this book. Yet in interviews he seems fairly cheerful. Glad to be rid of it, perhaps.

The fascination with Nazi Germany which I share with a lot of people is easily explained. It has a personal element. Germany in the Thirties was just like England in the Thirties. The people there had my father's and my mother's faces. Germans wrote great books and composed music and made movies and drank strong beer and everything. So when they went collectively insane, and these astonishing, horrifying racist visions erupted out of their hearts and minds, and they turned their brilliant energies to the business of taking over all the rest of Europe and wiping out an entire other race right down to the last tiny child, the question is obvious : they were just like us, so could all that have happened here? In England? In America? In France? If not, were the Germans in the Thirties and Forties all psychopaths? Obviously not. So what happened? And after the Gotterdammerung of 1945, did they all revert back to being the normal ordinary Germans we had before Hitler? Like waking up from some hypnotic spell or terrible drunken bender and finding a couple of dead bodies in the room and saying no, I couldn't have done that – that wasn't me! But it was.

The Germans (and we can use that term because everyone was involved) fought to the bitterest of all bitter ends, until the last bulletless Walther was prised from the last 14 year old boy's dead hand. Kershaw in his introduction makes a song and dance about why in the face of all the overwhelming power of the Allies in late 44 or early 45 did the Germans not capitulate? But it is very easy to see why. For a start, Goebbels' propaganda about the ravening Bolshevik hordes from the East turned out to be true. Germans knew what had been perpetrated during Operation Barbarossa, that their army had been the combine harvester of human agony, and so did the Russians. For the Red Army, as they invaded from the East, it was white hot payback time – civilian slaughter, routine rapes, you name it. Soviet propaganda : "Take merciless revenge on the Fascist child-murderers and executioners, pay them back for the blood and tears of Soviet mothers and children." To the West, from the gentler sensibilities of the British and Americans, came carpet bombing. The bombing campaigns altogether killed approximately 500,000 people. So if these things did not convince you to continue fighting, maybe this would :

EXECUTIONS FOR DESERTION – A COMPARISON

German soldiers executed for desertion in the First World War : 48
British soldiers executed for desertion in the First World War : 306
British soldiers executed for desertion in the second World War : 40
French soldiers executed for desertion in the second World War : 103
American soldiers executed for desertion in the second World War : 146
German soldiers executed for desertion in the second World War : approximately 20,000.

There was another more prosaic line of reason, if you could find any reason at all in this lunatic final year. Germans believed – correctly – that the Western governments hated communism as much as they did, and they figured that if they could stave off an invasion of central Germany long enough, the Americans and British would realise that the true enemy was not Germany but the USSR. So that was the vague, mad, stupid hope. And as we know, Patton wanted to roll the tanks on from Berlin to Moscow, so there was something in it.

GERMAN VOICES FROM DIARIES AND LETTERS 1944-45


Injured soldier writing home : I believe for certain that a change will soon come. On no account will we capitulate! That so much blood has already been spilt in this freedom fight cannot be in vain!

Lt Julius Dufner : We want to build a new Europe – we, the young people facing the old! But what are we? Famished, exhausted and drained by madmen. Poor and tired, worn out and nerve-ridden.

Martin Bormann writing to his wife: Anyone who still grants that we have a chance must be a great optimist! And that is just what we are! I just cannot believe that Destiny could have let our people and our Fuhrer so far along this wonderful road only to abandon us now and see us disappear forever. A victory for Bolshevism and Americanism would mean not only the extermination of our race but also the destruction of everything that its culture and civilisation has created.

As we know, the Soviet army surrounded Berlin in late April 1945 and battled its way in, street by street. By the time they reached the Chancellery Hitler had committed suicide. Curiously, this review was written on the day another dictator finally met his death, after his own city was taken street by street. But Gaddafi was hunted down and executed by the people of Libya. They liberated themselves. In Germany in 1945 there was no liberation, no one danced in the streets that the beast was dead, they were all conserving their energies which they knew they would need to fend off their own growing guilt and horror in having been a supporter and participant in the thing called Nazi Germany. For those looking for the triumph of the human spirit or democracy or something uplifting like that, avoid this book. The story it tells isn't anything like that.

[Helga · Rating 4 out of 5]

4.5

The world turned upside down and more than 60 million people died because of a deranged, egocentric madman.

The End chronicles Germany’s military, political and social position between the failed attempt to assassinate Hitler in July 1944 until the fall of the Third Reich and the dissolution of the government.

In spite of some repetitions here and there, the book is an excellent and detailed narrative of those last days of mayhem, bloodshed and chaos.

[fourtriplezed · Rating 5 out of 5]

In this excellent book Ian Kershaw scrutinises the fall of Nazi Germany from the Assassination attempt on Hitler in July 44 through to the final unconditional surrender.

Fascinating analysis is given throughout each chapter. Brilliant footnotes through to works cited (bibliography) that should have anyone interested in the subject of the last year of Nazi Germany’s demise salivating. For those who may wonder why Nazi Germany fought to the very limits of their capabilities this book covers many possible discussion points. A few follow.

The failed July 20th assassination plot left any possible opposition to the regime utterly leaderless, leading to the further politicisation of the Wehrmacht upper echelons. Any hint of insubordination towards even military tactics was treated as treasonous. With that any thought of political involvement in a movement to discuss the end with the allies was made moot once there was a demand for unconditional surrender. With military power now in the hands of Nazis it was now committed to victory or downfall. Also considered is if the assassination had been successful there could have been another ‘stab in the back’ legend.This played on the minds of many.

The blame game following the fall of France to the Allies was an event that was a great shock to all Germany. An example covered is that in September 1944 Aachen was the first city in Germany proper to come under Allied attack with the panic of the citizens and inability of the Nazi Party to organise and assist causing a “shambles” to quote the author. 116th Panzer Division arrived and took control of the civilian population by stopping the ‘stupid evacuation’. This evacuation comment by the commander General Gerd Graf von Schwerin lead to his eventual dismissal even with the defence becoming fierce. Hitler ordering an utmost radical defence of the city. Relationships between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht Officer class broke down with the Officer Class accused of being ‘saboteurs of war’ by even their own soldiers. To quote the author “…..sunk resignation, not burning rebellion….” became the course of the bitter defence.

Operation Bagration may have prolonged the war. Instead of a four front attack “a huge concentrated surge” through south Poland to cut off Centre and North army groups may possibly have allowed the Wehrmacht to be “patched up and fight on.” Inhabitants of East Prussia, with memories of Russian incursions in The Great War, were also more susceptible to Nazi anti Bolshevik propaganda than their western German counterparts. Those that had listened to the troops returning from the east knew that the war had been bitter and that atrocities towards Jews and the civilian populations had now become a serious issue for the average German with the Red Army on the doorstep.

The Battle of the Bulge and the decline of German economic output as the Allies attacks on transport networks etc takes its toll. A Werner Bosch, who worked for Speer, while under interrogation by the allies after the war had ended, was quoted as saying that people in his position “….could do nothing except get on with their own work” even considering that he thought the war lost in the Spring of 1944. He was one of many effective in keeping the war going for as long as it did no matter how desperate the situation. The regime also let the allied Morgenthau plan be known to the public at large. With this the plan to split Germany into a “powerless, dismembered country with a pre-industrial economy” played very much into the thoughts that there was ‘no opportunity’ for individuals ‘to take action against the war’.

So called defeatist attitudes were heavily punished. All ranks fought on due to fear of reprisals to their family plus general apathy in some circumstances. Even when most thought the war nearly over an automatic sense of obedience was held as other than family what else was there to do! Fatalism was a major issue with many. For those that deserted there was death. Many received death sentences from flying courts and those left fighting had little more to do than conform or face the harshest of penalties. Added was a propaganda campaign that at this point became shriller than all previous with specific reference to the “Asiatic hordes” as Nazi racial policy since 1933 had been ingrained into the masses. This caused mass panic among the civilian population with the soldiers being bombarded with exhortation to fight against those that would slaughter their women and children. Fear of foreigners was rife and even at the end the public invariably had no issue with the treatment of the prisoners on death marches as they were considered criminals.

At the top level many excuses were used from the duty not to the break loyalty pledge to Hitler, fear of Bolshevism through to the likes of Keitel, Jodl and Kesselring claiming they fought on in hope of the fracturing of the Allies into east and west camps. The state had built a cult around Hitler that was so solid in structure that there was little that could be changed. The elites had been divided and never had the “..collective will nor the mechanisms of power to prevent Hitler taking Germany to total destruction.”

Easily one of the the best books I have read. Highly recommended.

[Anthony · Rating 5 out of 5]

No Way Out.

Nazi Germany’s fight to the death in 1945 is unlike anything any other state has done in the modern era. Most when they have seen the situation hopeless, or in order to preserve the lives of their citizens have surrendered. But not Germany in the Second World War. Ian Kershaw’s excellent book looks to analyse this and answer the questions, ‘why and how did Germany continue to fight on as it did?’ What is most fascinating is the differences between 1945 and 1918, but ultimately it is because of 1918, that things happened in the way they did in 1945. There would never be a surrender, this was laid out in Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, his entire political philosophy was built around it. There are other factors at play too. As Kershaw explains the population this time was fighting for its life, Bolshevik Russia was on its doorstep, ready to overrun the Reich, people genuinely believed in the Führer and the brutal repression of the NSDAP order prevented any shameful revolution like in 1918.

In order to explain the end Kershaw first takes the reader to the July Plot of 1944. This was a catalyst. The war was not so obviously over at this point, so when the assassination attempt was made public there was genuine outrage for the life of Hitler, which gave his iron grip a second wind. Furthermore, it weakened the military leaders, aristocratic and Prussian, they already mistrusted by Hitler and now had completely lost their voice in their pledge to the dictator. The Führer’s henchmen also moved in with Heinrich Himmler and Martin Bormann taking key positions at the top of the order to continue the Nazi’s perverse agenda. It is important to note that Kershaw does not believe in the ‘innocent Wehrmacht’ myth and states that they knew and I’m even supported what the Nazis were up to. After all they had ever chance in the beginning to destroy him and stood by. Thus allowing a deranged Corporal drive their class, culture and country into the ground.

As the end became more and more apparent, the will to fight on became even stronger. For Hitler at the top, he knew he had no way out, it was victory or death. He had no future in defeat and so personally had nothing to loose, he famously had a complete distain for the German People, stating that as they had lost the way they deserved to be annihilated. He managed to tie together the idea of Germany and National Socialism, so that the idea and the country were one and the same and would go down together. With this Kershaw reveals the astonishing fact that Nazism only lived with the Führer, after him the whole thing was dead, as most Nazis believed.

The results were disastrous. Around 20,000 Germans were killed by the SS as traitors during this period of the war and up to a million soldiers, in the continued fight. Plus the millions of civilians murdered and raped. Kershaw does not hold back on the brutality of the Red Army bulldozing through the eastern provinces into East Prussia and then Berlin itself. We hear of the heartbreaking tales of civilians desperately trying to get onto the boats at the once beautiful city of Konigsburg, clambering to get out. Or arriving by train day and night into the capital, only to find hostilely by the inhabitants, as there was already huge competition for scarce supplies. And then there is the descriptions of the last days of Rome as everyone was seeking some release or enjoyment from the realities and horrors of war in what many knew was the end. Albert Speer had to take credit here for the ability of the Reich to continue fighting on as it did. Long the heir presumptive, with his huge capacity for work he was able to keep the industry of Germany going through these final stages so troops had ammunition and equipment to keep fighting.

This is a relatively short book, but is truly one from an expert of his subject. For me it delivers much better than his Hitler biography. The analysis and questions are throughly answered, from the personalities at the top, the mirror of the Great War, the propaganda machine of Josef Goebbels, the brutal suppression of anyone and everyone and intoxication of the youth to act as partisans. There is a lot this book has to offer and is fascinating on the downfall of the Third Reich and end of the Second World War.

[Eric_W · Rating 5 out of 5]

A man cuts some telephone lines he thinks connect the military bases one to another. He's seen by two members of the Hitler Jugend who report his actions. He's summarily arrested by the local police. The regional commander is summoned and a summary trial is conducted and the man executed. This scenario occurs just four hours from the town being overrun by the Allies in Germany. The question Kershaw asks and answers is why did local bureaucracies and systems continue to function so well as apocalypse was often just minutes away. Why continue to resist at a cost of inevitable total destruction. In early 1945, German soldiers were dying at a rate of 350,000 *per month.* It was a scale of killing that even dwarfed the First World War. British and American bombers were leveling cities and killing thousands of civilians, yet the populace and it's representative structure continued to resist and function.

I was confused in the beginning by what seemed to be contradictory points, i.e., that many in the general staff and lower ranks were very supportive of Hitler to the end while at the same time he cites numerous examples of terror shown to any kind of disloyalty or wavering on the part of civilians or military, especially after the Stauffenberg assassination attempt (an astonishing 20,000 German soldiers were shot as opposed to 40 British which would indicate to me a substantial level of defeatism or discord among the lower ranks). Special squads were created to enforce loyalty and the number of executions soared. At the same time he examines numerous letters and diaries showing support for Hitler among those soldiers and the civilian bureaucracy continued to function at a high level. I might argue that finding support for a position in the myriad number of papers left by the highly literate German people might be found regardless of the overall view.

Contradictions abound and just as one view was proposed, Kershaw presented evidence to the contrary. What’s much clearer is the entanglement of motivations of many different people for many different reasons. Partly, it was that Himmler brought his administration of terror from the East back to the Reich. Another was the personal loyalty of from those mignons at the top, Himmler, Bormann, Goebbels, et al, who derived their power from Hitler so it was natural they would remain fanatically loyal to the end. The extreme brutality of the Russian soldiers on the eastern front led to the desire to hasten westward where the Americans and British were perceived to be more amiable.

The slaughter at the end of the war is simply unimaginable and Kershaw doesn’t spare the reader. Hundreds of thousands died in the last few months of the war. Twice as much tonnage of bombs were dropped by the Allies in the first four months of 1945 than in all of 1943. Millions were left homeless and fled the approach of the Soviet Army eager to apply much of the same fearsome slaughter the Germans had inflicted on the Slavic people on their march east. Fifty percent of the German soldiers who died in the war were killed in the last ten months. A few deserted, most continued to fight. The machinery of the state continued and defeatists were murdered by Nazi death squads.

The failure of the Germans to give up when clearly all was lost may lie in the culture Hitler had created. The oft cited reason of allied demands for unconditional surrender Kershaw dispenses with, if not entirely convincingly. The German people had been so used to dictatorial and fanatic leadership that they were unable to do anything but follow orders and were suitably cowed and ripe for the leadership of anyone. Put broadly, the simplest reason may be that people simply “went along to get along.”

It’s a fascinating study. My only quibble is that I think the book might have been strengthened by a comparison with events in Japan, which, one might argue, were similar.

[Jill Hutchinson · Rating 5 out of 5]

The author looks at the question that we often don't ask.....what made Germany fight on in the last year of WWII, when their country was in total ruin, the social and economic system no longer existed, the military had to depend on old men and children, and the Red Army was at the gates of Berlin? He relates tales of unbelievable events that occurred when the horror that the Nazis wrought came home to the Reich.........the continuing wholesale murder of political/racial "enemies of the State" and the traveling military "courts" which condemned to death anyone considered a slacker/deserter. The killings and suicides escalated the closer the Allies came to bringing the war to an end and the country, for the most part, continued to follow Hitler's edict of "death before capitulation". The author posits several reasons for this blind obedience which I will not reveal here; but they seem credible since the post-war testimony from many Germans is not particularly reliable. I was fascinated and chilled by this book which illustrates the continuing inhumanity that existed even after the cause was lost.

[Ray · Rating 4 out of 5]

Disaster. Catastrophe. Chaos.

In mid 1944 it is clear that Germany has lost the war. The Allies are encroaching on all sides - Russia is slicing up the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front, the Americans and Brits have landed in Normandy, and the slow crawl up the Italian peninsular continues.

So how did Germany take the war into 1945? This book seeks to provide an answer.

As is often the case there is no one answer.

In part it was due to the fanatical determination of Hitler to succeed against the odds - to produce a triumph of the will - or take Germany down as well. The capture of the state by the Nazi party meant that the leading figures in the regime were all tied to Hitler and would rise or fall with him.

The failure of von Stauffenbergs assassination attempt in 1944 led to army purges and profession of loyalty from Generals torn between their oath of fealty to the state and the sorry situation on the battlefield.

The bureaucratic brilliance of munitions minister Albert Speer, the dogged persistance of the German civil service, the skill and improvisation of Germany's generals and the quality of its soldiers and armaments meant that resistance could continue long after the war was effectively lost.

A hard core of true believers in the Nazi vision - around 35% of the population - formed a deep reservoir of support, though this declined as reality set in and the long promised miracle weapons failed to materialise. Significant too was the fear of what the Russians would do on German soil - fears borne out in reality - which engendered fierce resistance to the end in the East.

After the assassination attempt internal repression increased dramatically. Arbitrary arrest and execution for merely expressing an opinion that the war was lost or doubting the ability of the Fuhrer became common. A cowed populace hunkered down in the ruins of shattered cities and awaited their fate.

Last and not least was the effect of the unconditional surrender doctrine implemented by the Allies which made it less likely that there would be a coup in the Army.

The final year of the war was fought close to home, with Germany reaping the whirlwind it had sown, leaving millions dead and with its towns and cities in ruins. Ten million Germans were evicted from the East and cities such as Konigsberg, Danzig and Breslau were lost forever.

[Kirsty · Rating 5 out of 5]

Knowing how much of a history geek I am, my parents bought me a copy of Ian Kershaw's The End: Germany, 1944-45. I read it over the course of a week, and cannot recommend it enough. As with his biographies of Hitler, which are both scholarly and fascinating, Kershaw writes with an authoritative and rather commanding voice. His research is impeccable.

The End is an admirable and far-reaching study indeed; in his preface, Kershaw writes: 'I have tried to take into account the mentalities of rulers and ruled, of Nazi leaders and lowly members of the civilian population, of generals and ordinary soldiers, and of both the eastern and the western fronts. It is a wide canvas and I have to paint it with a broad brush.' The End is intelligent, informative, and most of all accessible.

[Kusaimamekirai · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is hardly controversial to say that the creation of the Nazi party under Adolf Hitler was one of the most destructive, despicable, and transformative events of the 20th century. In addition to the death of millions of Jews, the countless murders of civilians in occupied territories, forced labor, and the horrors inflicted on the German populace itself, the rise and fall of Germany under the Nazis has been the subject of countless studies and books.
What Ian Kershaw does here however is look solely at the final 10 months of the war that followed the attempted assassination of Hitler by his generals in July of 1944.
This occurred at a time when for most German military men as well as civilians, the realization that the war was lost was becoming increasingly clear. The Allies had landed in Normandy the previous month and paris would be liberated a month later. The Soviets continued their push westward, reclaiming territory seized by the Germans and seizing resources vital to the German war effort.
The war was seemingly at an end. And yet formal surrender did not occur until May of 1945. Why?
Kershaw makes the argument that it was not solely the force of Hitler’s will to raze Germany to the ground and take down its population with him, although this was certainly a major factor. More important perhaps was the acquiescence of the generals, the gauleiters (the provincial leaders who acted as mini Hitlers in their fiefdoms) and the population itself to Hitler’s increasingly erratic and destructive orders.
The reasons for each doing so are varied and while understandable in context, do not absolve them of blame for the horrors of the final ten months of the war.
For the generals and the gauleiters, there were no real viable options outside of following Hitler to the bitter end. While some like Henreich Himmler, Albert Speer, and others did elect to save their own skins and run during the final months, others had no such options. When the choices, especially in East, were following irrational orders to murder anyone who dissents and blow up vital civilian installations needed after the war or being captured and likely murdered by the invading Russians, the choices were perhaps understandable. This was not a time of heroism. It was a time of saving one’s skin in any way possible.
For the general public fearing not only the oncoming Russians but also an increasingly murderous party apparatus clamping down on dissent, speaking up or taking moral stands against the abhorrent and murderous excesses at the end of the war was an increasingly unattractive and dangerous option.
In short, the final ten months of the war were marked by a sense of increasing lawlessness, internal German on German violence, paranoia and senseless destruction. Kershaw near the end of his book cites some truly astounding numbers as to just how bloody these final months were:

“A colossal price was paid for continuing the war to the bitter end. In the ten months between July 1944 and May 1945 far more German civilians died than in the previous years of the war, mostly through air raids and in the calamitous conditions in the eastern regions after January 1945. In all, more than 400,000 were killed and 800,000 injured by Allied bombing, which had destroyed more than 1.8 million homes and forced the evacuation of almost 5 million people, the vast majority of the devastation being inflicted in the last months of the war. The Soviet invasion then occupation of the eastern regions of Germany after January 1945 resulted in the deaths, apart from the immeasurable suffering caused and the deportation of many German citizens to an uncertain fate in the Soviet Union, of around half a million civilians.”

These are truly appalling and astounding numbers and are a testament to the folly that blind loyalty to a single figure can bring about. That Germany had to suffer the whole preventable fate it did for the final 10 months is an unspeakable tragedy that will hopefully never repeat itself.

[Dimitar Angelov · Rating 4 out of 5]

Професионална и отлично написана история на последните месеци от съществуването на Третия райх. За разлика от повечето исторически книги ��о същата тема тук "драмата в бункера" е оставена настрани и бива спомената само мимоходом.

Фокусът на Кършоу е по-широк - той описва мъчителното и учудващо продъжлително сгромолясване на германската държава и на срасналия се с нея националсоциалистически режим в периода юли 1944 - май 1945 г. Големият въпрос, който британският историк задава още в самото начало, е защо Германия и германците, водени от своя Фюрер, опорстват до последно (с цената на милиони жертви само за няколко месеца).

Според Кършоу няма просто обяснение за наглед ирационалното желание на германските управници, военни, но и на съществени части от населението да продължават да водят война, чийто завършек към 1944 г. изглежда повече от предрешен. Влияние оказват множество и разнообразни фактори - широко разпространеният в германското общество страх от болшевизма; съпъстващият го страх от отмъщението на съветските войски (предвид извършеното от Вермахта); изключително ефективната пропагандна машина на Гьобелс, която засилва тези страхове стократно; политиката на Тримата големи за "безусловната капитулация", която дава малко възможности за маневриране и излизане от войната с някакво достойнство; фикс идеята на германската върхушка (вкл. военна) да не се повтаря "предателството от ноември 1918 г."; фанатизмът на сравнително малки, но влиятелни обществени маси, сред които членове на СС и военизирания СС (вкл. чуждестранни доброволци); и разбира се - факторът "Хитлер" - ръководителят на Третия райх решава да не измени на позициите си, заявени още през 20-те години, и да остане начело на страната си дори когато съветските войски се намират на стотина метра от бункера му (след което според Кършоу избира най-лесния за себе си вариант - да се самоубие, вместо да бъде поруган, както Мусолини в Италия).

Всички тези фактори допринасят за това войната да се проточи с няколко месеца повече от "разумното", цената, за което са няколкото милиона загинали войници и цивилни. Тази цена обаче изглежда по-приемлива за Хитлер, за повечето му приближени (колкото и да се оправдават след войната някои от тях) и за критична част от германското население в сравнение с наличните алтернативи (реални или въобразени такива). Да - пососочва Кършоу - вероятно Гьоринг (официалният наследник на фюрерския пост почти до самия край) би проявил разум и би потърсил опции за договорно излизане от войната; друг би бил развоят на събитията също така и ако военните бяха свалили Хитлер от власт много по-рано, още преди десанта в Нормандия и окончателното пропукване на Източния фронт (тогава действително преговорните позиции биха били други), но всичко това остават хипотези и размишления, които нямат общо със случилото се. От множеството "ако" в историята можем да вземем поуки само за бъдещето, но не и да преначертаем миналото.

[Ana · Rating 5 out of 5]

phew. this has been e legitimate "tour de force" in order to finish it, but i'm actually convinced that reading it in a very frenetic way helped with the atmosphere that this book was supposed to touch on.

"The End" is the collection of all informations regarding Germany's situation between the 20th of July 1944 (the day of the biggest attack on Hitler, the bomb placed in his wolf nest at the feet of the conference table that managed only to scratch him a bit and affect his prestige, more than anything) and 8-9 May of 1945, when Germany's capitulation was signed by multiple state/military leaders.

now, because it refers to such a short span of time, it was bound to repeat itself and re-tell things that were already clear in the mind of the reader. but, if you remember that we're only talking of a span of 10 months, this book is an unbelievably detailed document on anything you would want to know of that period:

1. politics: the power centers; Hitler, head of state, his four best accolites, Speer, Goebbles, Himmler and Bormann; other important leaders of different parties/institutions; a very honest and impersonal eye is thrown about, allowing the reader to get a real sense of how the power games were played and who was holding all the strings.

2. military: though the book doesn't focus on military operations, as we were warned in Kershaw's introduction, it still is a valuable source of information when it comes to numbers, giving specific quantum for every military operation in those 10 months; also, with the help of some very well done maps spread about the book, you can visualize the information you are given in terms of battles and front lines.

3. economy: after all, the big question that the book is trying to answer is how did Germany manage to resist and deny its end for such a long period of time? the answer, Kershaw leads us to believe, is a combination of multiple factors, between which economy seems to have the biggest importance. in these terms, the book is a fine analysis of the economic situation of Germany and all the solutions that the governing hand applied in order to keep the fight going.

4: "the final solution": how the system took care of their concentration camps and how many victims were there exactly; also, it doesn't spare the reader the gruesome images that these atrocities left on the retinae of humanity.

5: population: a lot of attention is paid to what the population thought, who they blamed, how they held on and why exactly did they not do anything to change the oppressive, horrible system that took hold of their lives.

this book is truly a coronation of a historian's work: perfect narrative structure, massive informative basis for anyone interested in that period and imposes a frantic rhythm on the reader as you really really really want to find out why/who/where/when did those things happen.

[Lobstergirl · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kershaw's question - why did Germany continue to fight to the absolute bitter end, at which point most of it was in ruins and occupied by Allies - is much less mysterious to me than the question of why the German people, from the thirties on, allowed this monster to have complete control over them. But that's obviously a different book. In this story, they fight because Hitler commanded them to. He did not want a repeat of 1918. The soldiers on the eastern front fought longer than those on the western front, because surrendering to the Red Army suggested horrors both imagined (via Goebbels' insistent propaganda) and real (one third of the German POWs taken to the USSR after the war ended died there, about one million). On the western front, soldiers and civilians knew they would, almost without exception, be treated well by the Americans, British, and French occupiers.

(Leave aside the fact that many soldiers didn't fight to the bitter end - they deserted - and they were either rounded up and sent back to the front, or executed. And some Nazi officials abandoned their districts disgracefully and fled as their civilian populations stayed, not having gotten permission or the order to evacuate.)

Kershaw's answer is that Hitler's charismatic rule, in the sense that Max Weber gave it, bound those under him to his wishes and commands. "Paradoxically, it was by this time charismatic rule without charisma. Hitler's mass charismatic appeal had long since dissolved, but the structures and mentalities of his charismatic rule lasted until his death in the bunker. The dominant elites, divided as they were, possessed neither the collective will nor the mechanisms of power to prevent Hitler taking Germany to total destruction." (p. 400)

[Tim Pendry · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is what good history should be about - an evidence-based narrative exploration offering the best working explanation of a particular problem of possible concern to us today.

Ian Kershaw asks a simple question of why Germany continued to fight on, far beyond reason, against the overwhelming force of Russian manpower and of Anglo-American air and technical superiority.

The book takes us from the failed Operation Valkyrie (the only serious revolt by conservative nationalists against national socialism) in July 1944 to the final capitulation in May 1945.

These were ten months in which it was pretty clear after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive and then the massive punch of the Soviets to within 80km of Berlin that the 'regime' had no chance of survival.

Yet Germany fought on - not just the Nazi Party but the entire military, the bureaucracy, the increasingly discredited judiciary and a good proportion of the common people. Kershaw simply asks why?

This period saw not just the military dead but the death marches of concentration camp victims, significant refugee losses, mass aerial bombings (including Dresden) and German-on-German terror.

And yet the system did not break even as the country was split - not until Hitler was known to be dead and a more rational if still ferociously Nazi Donitz eventually sued for unconditional peace.

Can it be down to the force of Hitler's will or the blind obedience of the German people? Kershaw explores these and many other reasons and like all the best history comes up with some very complex answers.

However, the best history seeks patterns in the chaos and in the interweaving of many causes and effects. Kershaw is no exception. There was some binding force that locked Germany into its apocalypse.

Kershaw finds this force in the functional reality of the 'fuhrerprinzip' where military, bureaucracy, party and national identity were bound into one locus represented by a monomaniac.

Unlike Italy, where Mussolini could be ousted by the Fascist Grand Council and the military and state be redirected under a national identity separate from the man, Germany was bound into one figure.

Beneath this man, all the players could dispose of forces towards one end set by Hitler but under conditions where each gathered power in competition with the other.

After Valkyrie, Bormann turned the Party into a mechanism of terror directed at controlling the German people through fear. Goebbels took responsibility for the engagement of the masses in the war effort.

Speer used his power to broker a corporatist economic state directed at armaments production, binding military, industrialists, workers and, more unwillingly than most, slave labour.

Himmler imposed discipline on the army in a collaborative relationship with the Wehrmacht. Powerful pro-Nazi Generals took advantage of Valkyrie to place their honour and duty in the hands of the Fuhrer.

Above all, the whole 'fuhrerprinzip' was underpinned by a dreadful combination of German nationalist duty and honour and national socialist fanaticism against both communism and the 'Jewish threat'.

If most soldiers may not have cared that much about the Jews, they were prepared to sacrifice them and other race-hate targets in the primary war against the Bolsheviks.

It was this hatred of the East which bound military and Hitler together and the hatred was fully returned. Soviet vengeance became a genuine fear factor in the continuation of the war.

Any deal with the West that did not allow Germany to release its troops to fight the Soviets was seen as a cultural and possibly real death sentence for half of the country.

Anti-communist fanaticism and fear were so strong that senior figures often could not comprehend that the Western Empires would prefer to fight alongside Stalin to the end rather than save Germany.

If I have not mentioned the opinions of the ordinary German (though Kershaw is very enlightening here) it is only because they had very little to say that mattered. They were not permitted much agency.

By the last months of the war, Germans, including ordinary German soldiers in some zones, were placed under a brutal terror regime of arbitrary executions that meant revolt was a death sentence.

And this is what strikes us about the story - the extreme lack of agency offered by the 'regime' where, although paid the weekly or monthly cheque to the end, a German was the slave of his Government.

Kershaw is also good on the fundamental attitudinal split between military and civilians in the East (fearful of Soviet atrocities) and in the West (almost desperate in some places for the Allies to arrive).

He also reminds us of the human cost, with atrocities in which no player in the game was not guilty. Nazi atrocities in the East were simply compounded at home under what amounted to a gangster regime.

Soviet atrocities were real enough (it took some time for control to be re-asserted by the authorities over their own occupying troops) and led to a tragic refugee exodus in icy conditions.

The French destroyed a whole village under circumstances still not clear today and the mass aerial bombing of German civilians by the British, notably the fire storm at Dresden, still leaves a bad taste.

This was a maelstrom of horror in which the men at the top (and their wives) reveled in their own fanaticism, desperation, 'heroism', brutality and power. But can we learn from this?

The puzzlement of Kershaw was that it was so rare, possibly unique, in history for a state to go so far and so willingly down the road to potential annihilation and at such cost to itself.

It is unlikely that it will ever be repeated as a case since now we know that even communist regimes can fall without a fight - their internal complexity perhaps helps to explain why.

Perhaps Stalin's Russia came closest and perhaps it was an intelligent analysis of his own situation - a lesson that Saddam Hussein attempted to copy, not reckoning on the sheer firepower of the US.

The story tells us something about our species and power that, on reflection, is rather grim - it is that the state's strength is in opposition to individual agency on terms very favourable to the former.

Even in our lovely cuddly liberal democracies, the state has immense reserve powers - as Americans saw under Woodrow Wilson and Britons saw under Lloyd George and Churchill. These are truly formidable.

We think our agency is a human right in that magical thinking about contracts and rights of which liberals are so fond. It is true that political culture in the West usually restrains the worst of the State.

But be under no illusions that the restraint exists only because those who control the State do not have a monomaniac will to use the State for some mad cap ideal. It is convenient for them to separate powers.

If a State is so disrupted that a monomaniac can systematically unravel pluralism and centre the bureaucracy, the military and the police on him then you and I do not stand a chance.

We are then simply not in a position to organise anything but the most futile of resistance (basically, we die or are imprisoned). We should remember this when think of the powers now accruing to the NSA.

This leaves us with an interesting dilemma in our dealings with the modern state. Do we trust it to be restrained and hope it is never disrupted so that some extremist loon can seize power?

Or do we begin to consider how we can make sure that the State is always actually rather than theoretically beholden us. In short, what checks can we the people make against a loss of checks and balances.

Certainly, in 1933, the elite handed power to a genius in political manipulation and turned itself into his willing creature. Within a little over a decade, the population ended up in a hell on earth.

Even today, the British and American military have ideologies of duty and honour towards single sovereigns that are scarcely different from that of the Wehrmacht in functional terms.

It is, of course, extremely unlikely that we, in the West, would be ruled by a monomaniac able to terrorise us into total compliance but, even today, the state's weapon of choice remains fear and half truths.

Outside the West, the idea of monomania is less ridiculous when there are religious and nationalist parties which offer path ways not dissimilar to that of the Nazis in the drive to control the State.

Perhaps this is why Sisi's coup in Egypt may not be pleasant but should be heartening in a way. The military turned away from obscurantist magical thinking in favour of rational administration.

The book should thus be read not as something distant from us but as a lesson in our lack of agency even in more benign conditions and in the ridiculous power that we give to institutions and belief systems

It should also be read as an essay in the consequences of particular modes of thinking - duty and honour in the military, duty and 'public service' in the bureaucracy and belief in the party and the nation.

We think of heroism, duty, honour, ideals and often faith (though less so with maturity and education) as positives but they are not if there is no serious questioning of why the heroic act and to whom the duty.

In Silesia, the Soviet advance isolated a town. The local Gauleiter became a Nazi hero for his defence to the end against the 'Asiatic horde' but the citizens would have done better to have surrendered.

This is not an argument for pacifism or 'cowardice' but for reason. Continuing a fight against overwhelming odds for gangsters is simply stupid, worse, it is criminal where lives are concerned.

It is time to look duty, obedience, honour, authority, custom, claims of heroism, idealism and leadership in the eye and call them out by asking them why and for whom people hold to these magical beliefs.

The Nazi regime was a merger of an aristocratic presumption on its last legs and the resentments at the uglier end of the masses in a malign war on modernity and progress.

Such people were not and never could be heroes. They were simply, so it was proved, not bright enough to understand their own condition and they dragged a lot of innocent people down with them.

Let them now be cursed again. In the end, these were only dim thugs who denied humanity its greatest evolutionary prize - personal agency and freedom.

[Andrew · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kershaw's reputation as one of the most important & insightful historians of the Third Reich is both reinforced and enhanced in 'The End'. Replete with appropriate and well integrated source materials that illustrate and inform his historical arguments, 'The End' should be read by anyone wanting to explore both the Gotterdammerung of Nazi Germany in the last eleven months of the European theatre of WW2, as well as how a totalitarian system can pervert a state into its own suicide.

That Kershaw develops a multi-strand historical response to the initial question that frames this book (Why did the Third Reich fight on till its destruction?) and uses a wealth of primary resources, official and anecdotal, to formulate this is to be highly commended. This is not a simplistic argument for the primacy of one reason alone, nor is it an exoneration of those who have reshaped their version of the history post facto. Kershaw does an excellent job of dispelling myths (e.g. the extent of the casualties of the Dresden raids, the complicity of Speer & Donitz in maintaining the Nazi regime & supporting Hitler), finding important rationalisations for German behaviours in the dying days of the war, and also reminding the reader that there are still uncertainties at play.

The author's prose is clear and highly readable, with the bare minimum of technical and untranslated German terms. To some extent Kershaw does rely on the reader possessing some assumed knowledge, however that is not unreasonable. he doesn't rely on counter-factuals to help prove his points, though he does make reference to them. The quantity and quality of footnoting is impressive and reinforces the scholarly worth of the historical study.

It must also be mentioned that Kershaw doesn't shy away from the moral issues that are bound up in understanding the dying months of Nazi Germany, with specific reference to the complicity of the general German people in war crimes, and their response to those crimes committed against them by both the Nazis and particularly the Soviets. There is a morass of ambiguity and guilt that darkens everyone who was immersed in the Nazi regime before July 1944 that damned so many after that date. How so many responded to the impending defeat and occupation of the Third Reich, particularly in the east, may be seen as a follow on from their positive engagement with the Nazis before the disasters of the last year of WW2 in Europe.

In summary, this is a significant and well written historical study of Nazi Germany as it went through its death throes. It should be read by anyone with an interest in the period and the nature of totalitarianism as a whole. Kershaw has produced a definitive work that may well be equalled, but perhaps never to be surpassed.

[Mark · Rating 4 out of 5]

In The End, Kershaw attempts to explain why the German people fought on to the brutal end of WWII. He starts off by discussing the pervasiveness and effectiveness of terror in the last days of the war, but rejects that as being insufficient. He then reviews more recent research, which has demonstrated the willingness of the German people to go down with the regime. Kershaw also finds this to be insufficient. Kershaw also examines the Allied demand for unconditional surrender, and determines that, while a factor, it was not a decisive issue compelling Germans to continue the fight. Kershaw seeks an explanation within the structures and mentalities of "charismatic rule".

Conclusions:

1. The population did not back the Nazis to the end, however, there was no realistic alternative for them but to continue the fight. Nazi terrorism against the German population grew as the losses became more severe. As Nazi rule deteriorated, the governing regime ran completely amok as police, SS, regional, and local party fanatics took matters into their own hands.
2. The savagery of war in the east provided an example of the even worse horrors that awaited a defeated Germany. An interesting example is given: Nemmersdorf, taken by the Red Army, then re-taken by the Wehrmacht, was used as propaganda to stiffen the spines of the German civilian defenders. Atrocities committed by the Red Army were said to await all in their path. No wonder, then, that Germans in the East were willing to keep fighting.
3. At the end, though, the author presents vast quantities of evidence demonstrating how Hitler's fanaticism percolated down through the ranks of his regime. This fanaticism, ruthlessly executed by his loyal officers, drove the nation to utter and complete annihilation. Absolute, blind fanaticism was the key to wringing every last drop of effort from the deeply demoralized Germans.

This is a difficult book to read, not just for the subject matter, but for the density and quantity of evidence presented. The book will be of greatest value to serious historians and scholars, but is perhaps a little-over detailed for the non-specialist. But The End is a finely written and well-argued work, well worth the challenge.

[Legate of Suvla · Rating 4 out of 5]

Üstat Selçuk Uygur'un çevirisi ile 2. Dünya Savaşı külliyatında eksik kalan bir noktaya konmuş olan bir sağlam tuğla daha. Aslında bu kitabın öncesinde Hüsrev Gerede'nin 1939 - 1942 yılları arasındaki Berlin Sefareti anılarını okuyarak bu esere başlamayı düşünüyordum ama merak kediyi bu sefer öldürdü, nefsime yenildim diyelim.

İşin şakası bir yana 2DS üzerine sürekli çeşitli kaynakları fırsat buldukça okumaya çalışıyoruz ama farkında olmadan bazı soruları da kendimize sormadan da öyle geçip gidiyoruz. İtiraf etmem gerekirse Çöküş'ü okuyana kadar Almanların imha derecesinde savaşa devam etmelerindeki motivasyonun sebebini ben de kendime sormamıştım: Sahi süreç belli, netice belli. Eee?
Bu soru çok basit ve cahilce sorulmuş gibi görünebilir ama alınan cevaplar hiç de öyle değil.

Kitap bu soruya çok katmanlı ve çok yönlü açıdan cevap veriyor, "untermensch" olarak kabul edilen en alt halk tabakalarından tutun, sıradan halktan en üst reich kademesine kadar hatta yeri geldiğinde kişi bazlı da olmak üzere, tabaka tabaka olaylara bakış açılarını kronolojik bir biçimde sağlam kaynakçalara başvurarak okuyucunun önüne cevapları çeşitli etiksel ikilemlerle beraber sunuyor, öyle ki ben olsam ne yapardım acaba diye düşünmeden edemediğiniz ama cevaplarının da sizde olmadığı soruları kendinize sorarken buluyorsunuz.
Kaynakça demişken, kitabın neredeyse her sayfasında bir atıf mevcut, bu yönüyle bile konunun nasıl derinlemesine ve ciddi ele aldığını görmüş oluyorsunuz.

Çeviriye gelecek olursak, edeceğimiz en ufak bir iltifatla bile Selçuk Uygur'a ayıp ederiz gibime geliyor. Cümle kurulumlarından kitabın ne kadar ağır dille kaleme alınmış olduğunu okurken bile hissedebiliyorsunuz ama işte bu noktada da tecrübe konuşuyor, kitap sizi kesinlikle okurken yormuyor, çeviriye bir kez daha hayran kalıyorsunuz.

Tabii ki kitabın eksi yönleri de yok değil, o da eksi olarak kabul edilirse.
Öncelikle kitap kronolojik bir şekilde devam etse de kitap aslında her bölümde size aynı cevap veriyor, yani sürecin dramatik bir şekilde değişecek bir durumu haliyle olmadığı için kitabın yarısına geldiğinizde aşağı yukarı kafanızda bir fikir oturuyor ve bir noktadan sonra aynı sorulara aynı cevapları alıyorsunuz. Cevaplar da ise zaten bir sıkıntı yok, sağlam temeller ve doğru neden sonuç ilişkisi üzerine oturduğundan ötürü okuyucuyu -bence- yeterince tatmin ediyor.

Şimdi ki istikamet Hüsrev Gerede'nin anıları. Umarım daha önce okumadığımdan ötürü pişman olmam. İyi okumalar dilerim.

[Nikola Jankovic · Rating 4 out of 5]

Šest godina Drugog svetskog rata je najintenzivniji deo istorije čovečanstva. Ne samo gledano u globalu, kao konflikt koji je odneo više od 50 miliona života, već i iz očiju pojedinca i drame koju su preživljavali. Život i smrt, strah, tuga, bol i muke; neiscrpan izvor nadahnuća za pisce poslednjih 70 a i narednih nekoliko stotina godina.

Fascinacija ovim periodom, međutim, retko prelazi na drugu stranu. Šta su preživljavali stanovnici Rajha 1944 i 1945? I kako je Hitlerov režim preživeo do tako strašnog kraja i potpunog - ne samo vojnog - sloma.

Kershaw (njegova monstruozna biografija Hitlera od 1,000+ strana će verovatno još neko vreme ostati na mojoj to-read-listi) se bavi time, otkriva stanje u vrhu vlasti, ali i u vojsci i na ulicama nemačkih gradova. Kroz psihologiju pojedinca i psihologiju mase pokušava da objasni razloge koji su doveli do toga da su Nemci pratili Hitlera do vlastite propasti.

Autor veruje da je najbitniji razlog za to Hitlerova harizma, te način vladanja i struktura vlasti koje su proistekle iz nje. Potpuna lojalnost svojih najbližih sledbenika - posebno nakon čistke posle neuspelog atentata jula '44. Ljudi koji su bez sumnje razumeli kakva je sudbina Rajha, ali kojima je bilo to da ne razočaraju svog Firera, važnije od miliona života koje su mogli sačuvati vojnim pučem ili jednostavnim atentatom.

Ostali faktori o kojima priča su podrška među stanovništvom. Do poraza u Ardenima početkom 1945 dosta glasno izražena, ali i kasnije slaganje sa politikom odbrane Otadžbine po cenu povećanih žrtvi. Strah od boljševika na istoku je bio takođe bitan razlog borbe do kraja, kao i dominacija partije i aparata terora koji je razvijen kroz sistem aparatčika i lokalnih vođa. Nije nebitna ni bespogovorna lojalnost ne samo na vrhu vlasti, već i do običnog vojnika, koji su u većini slučajeva bili spremni da slepo prate naredbe.

Kad se sve uzme u obzir, očigledno do Hitlerove smrti nije moglo drugačije. Zato su jedina šansa za spas Nemačke bili najviši oficiri Wehrmachta, koji su imali pristup Hitleru i koji su zbog svoje vojničke časti i ljubavi prema Otadžbini trebali da ga svrgnu ili sklone. Ako ni zbog čega drugog, onda zbog stotina hiljada civilnih žrtava savezničkih bombardovanja najvećih Nemačkih gradova.

Velika preporuka za ljubitelje istorije.

[Ana Castro · Rating 3 out of 5]

Para complementar o livro de Harald Jähner que li no Verão (A hora dos lobos) interessou-me este entre 4 livros que tenho no kobo do escritor inglês Ian Kershaw.

O autor pretendia com este livro responder a uma questão que poucos entendem : dado o grau de calamidade crescente como e porquê o regime de Hitler continuou a funcionar por tanto tempo, deixando a Alemanha transformar -se num imenso matadouro nos últimos meses do Terceiro Reich.

Tudo porque o endemoninhado chefe do regime - Hitler afirmou após o atentado de que foi alvo em Julho de 1944:
“ Quem me falar de paz sem vitória perderá a vida , seja ele quem for ou qualquer que seja o cargo que ocupe “

A Alemanha e os alemães colheram o que semearam .
O caos e a destruição das suas cidades.
As barbáries sobre a sua população civil sobretudo por parte dos invasores de leste : o exército vermelho.

As barbaridades executadas por guardas indiferenciados sobre os prisioneiros dos campos de concentração de forma a que o inimigo nunca os libertasse são descrições pavorosas daquilo que os homens podem fazer em ambiente de matança.
Matam aos milhares sem dó nem piedade indiferentes que sejam estrangeiros ou alemães, judeus ou de outra crença.
Matar por tudo e por nada sem critério nem objetivo.

Ian kershaw fez um tratado sobre a luta final dos alemães, muito bem documentado com páginas e páginas de notas pé de página e bibliografia.
Torna-se lento e por vezes repetitivo .
Demasiado pormenor que talvez não fosse necessário ser tão exaustivo.
Demorei bastante tempo e por vezes tinha que baixar o kobo e respirar fundo tal a violência de algumas descrições.
Demorei bastante tempo pois fui lendo outras histórias pelo meio.
Aprendi bastante mais do que já sabia sobre a 2.ª Grande Guerra .
E também eu, com algum esforço , consegui ir “Até ao fim “

[Emma · Rating 4 out of 5]

Review to come.

[প্রীতম চট্টোপাধ্যায় · Rating 5 out of 5]

Book: The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany 1944-45
Author: Ian Kershaw
Publisher: ‎ Penguin Press (8 September 2011)
Language: ‎ English
Hardcover: ‎ 592 pages
Item Weight: ‎ 1 kg 160 g
Dimensions: ‎ 15.88 x 5.08 x 24.13 cm
Country of Origin: ‎ USA
Price: 542/-

As catastrophic defeat loomed in early 1945, Germans were sometimes heard to say they would prefer ‘an end with horror, to a horror without end’. An ‘end with horror’ was certainly what they experienced, in ways and dimensions unprecedented in history.

The tale of the ‘end’, the human loss on an immense scale and the devastation wrought in its wake is what this book is about.

Much of this could have been avoided had Germany been prepared to bow to Allied terms. The refusal to contemplate capitulation before May 1945 was, therefore, for the Reich and the Nazi regime not just destructive, but also self-destructive.

The Germans expected an invasion of the continent. But could not make out as to where the invasion was to come. As a result, they tried to guard the whole of the coast-line facing Great Britain. In June 1944, Normandy was attacked. Despite hard fighting, the troops of the United Nations were able to make a landing on the mainland. After getting reinforcements, the United Nations were able to capture Paris and also succeeded in driving out the Germans from the French soil.

After completing the conquest of Italy, the army of General Alexander invaded France from the South-East and then the South of France was also cleared of the enemy. The army of General Alexander joined that of Eisenhower on the Rhine.

There was a German counter-attack in December 1944 under Rundstedt, but after some success, the same was repulsed. When the armies under General Eisenhower crossed the Rhine and moved towards the Elbe, the Russians also invaded Germany from the East. The failure of the German Ardennes offensive meant that when, in January 1945, the Soviets launched a new offensive there were no more German reserves to deploy against them. The same was true when the Western Allies resumed their advance in February 1945.

In the East, disasters mounted though, even at this late stage, German resistance was tenacious. In February, the German navy succeeded in evacuating four military divisions and 1.5 million civilians from Baltic ports before they fell to the Red Army. It was a feat assisted by the striking inactivity of surface ships of the Soviet’s Baltic Fleet. Even so, the evacuation witnessed the worst maritime disaster in history when a Soviet submarine sank the liner Wilhelm Gustloff, with the loss of 9,000 civilians.

It was German civilians who now suffered the full fury of the Red Army. Black humour in Berlin that winter remarked: ‘Enjoy the war while you can, the peace will be terrible.’

But the reality was no laughing matter.

As Soviet troops crossed the borders of the Reich they murdered and raped in atrocious revenge for the Nazi atrocities in the USSR. The German home front disintegrated in inconceivable horrors. In conclusion, in the ruins of Berlin, old men and teenagers fought in the scantily armed ranks of the Volkssturm (Home Guard) against Soviet tanks.

On 29 April, Hitler married his long-term mistress Eva Braun. In the chaotic last hours of the Third Reich, the only official who could be found to conduct the wedding was Walter Wagner, deputy surveyor of local rubbish collections in a district of Berlin.

With the Red Army just a few streets from the Führer Bunker, Hitler dictated his last will and testament. In it he nominated Admiral Karl Dönitz as the new President of Germany and Goebbels as the new Reich Chancellor.

At about 3.30 p.m. on Monday 30 April 1945, Hitler (and Eva Hitler) committed suicide in his underground bunker below the Reich Chancellery. Above him, Berlin was in ruins.

Hitler’s vision of life had finally ended in a destructive defeat reminiscent of Wagner’s Götterdämmerung (the mythical war of the Norse gods that, in ancient Germanic legend, was thought to bring about the end of the world). Shortly afterwards – on 1 May – Goebbels and his wife Magda also killed themselves; they had earlier poisoned their six children. This left Admiral Dönitz as sole leader of what was left of Germany.

On 2 May, German army units in Berlin surrendered. Over the ruined Reichstag building flew the red and gold hammer and sickle flag of the USSR. It had been improvised from a red tablecloth by a Red Army cameraman, the Ukrainian Jew Yevgenny Khaldei.

The famous photograph of its raising on the building had later to be airbrushed to remove the – all too obviously looted – multiple wristwatches visible on the wrist of one of the young Red Army soldiers.

The destruction and humiliation of the Third Reich could hardly have been more strikingly staged. At 2.41 a.m. on Monday 7 May, the Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces High Command, General Alfred Jodl, on behalf of the new German government of Admiral Dönitz, surrendered unconditionally to the Western Allies at Rheims, France. Since no representative of the USSR was at this event, the surrender was repeated two days later in Berlin (backdated to 8 May).

The last fighting of the war is usually considered to have ended at about 4 p.m. on Tuesday 15 May when a mixed force of Croatian, Slovenian and Montenegrin allies of the Germans finally surrendered to Yugoslav partisans at Poljana, in Yugoslavia (now in modern Slovenia).

The Germans could not fight on two fronts and Hitler, Goebbels and Himmler committed suicide and their successors surrendered unconditionally on 7 May 1945.

The book has been dividedinto the following nine chapters:

1. Shock to the System
2. Collapse in the West
3. Foretaste of Horror
4. Hopes Raised – and Dashed
5. Calamity in the East
6. Terror Comes Home
7. Crumbling Foundations
8. Implosion
9. Liquidation

The reasons for Germany’s collapse are evident to us in the light of hundreds of books written by historians. But why and how Hitler’s Reich kept on functioning till the bitter end is less obvious. That is what this book seeks to explain.

The fact that the Reich did hold out to the end – and that the war ended only when Germany was militarily battered into submission, its economy destroyed, its cities in ruins, the country occupied by foreign powers – is historically an extreme rarity. Wars between states in the modern era have usually ended in some kind of negotiated settlement.

The ruling elites of a state facing military defeat have generally sued for peace at some point, and eventually, under some duress, reached a territorial agreement, however disadvantageous. The end of the First World War fitted this pattern. The end of the Second was completely different. The rulers of Germany in 1945, knowing the war was lost and complete destruction beckoned, were nevertheless prepared to fight on until their country was practically obliterated.

The author digs deep into the character of Hitler and how he influenced the overall character of the Reich.

Beyond the significance of the Allied demand for ‘unconditional surrender’, one could ask how far Allied mistakes in strategy and tactics, which certainly occurred, weakened their own efforts to bring the war to an early end and temporarily boosted the confidence of the German defenders. But whatever significance might accrue to such factors, the determining reasons for Germany’s continued fight have surely to be explained internally, from within the Third Reich, rather than externally, through Allied policy.

A number of questions arise out of the author’s analysis.

1) What weight, for instance, should we attach to the feeling of Nazi leaders that they had nothing to lose by fighting on, since they had in any case ‘burnt their boats’?

2) How significant, indeed, was the greatly expanded scope of the Nazi Party’s powers in the final phase, as it sought to revitalize itself by evoking the spirit of the ‘period of struggle’ before 1933?

3) In what ways did a highly qualified and able state bureaucracy contribute, despite increasing and ultimately overwhelming administrative disorder, to the capacity to hold out?

4) How important was the fear of the Red Army in sustaining the fight to the end?

5) Why were German officers, especially the generals in crucial command posts, prepared to fight on even when they recognized the futility of the struggle and the absurdity of the orders they were being given?

6) What role was played by the leading Nazis beneath Hitler – in particular the crucial quadrumvirate of Bormann, Himmler, Goebbels and Speer – and the provincial viceroys, the Gauleiter, in ensuring that the war effort could be sustained despite mounting, then overwhelming, odds until the regime had destroyed itself in the maelstrom of total military defeat?

7) How indispensable was the role of Speer in continuing to defy enormous obstacles to provide armaments for the Wehrmacht?

8) Finally, though far from least, there is the part played by Hitler himself and the lasting allegiance to him within the German power elites.

Hitler’s own central part in Germany’s self-destructive urges as the Reich collapsed is obvious. Above all, his continued power provided a barrier to any possibility, which his paladins were keen to explore, of negotiating a way out of the escalating death and destruction.

But this only brings us back to the question: why was he able to do this? In this regard, Ian Kershaw raises the following questions: -

1) Why did Hitler’s writ continue to run when it was obvious to all around him that he was dragging them down with him and taking his country to perdition?

2) Accepting that Hitler was a self-destructive individual, why did the ruling elites below him – military, Party, government – allow him to block all normal exit routes?

3) Why was no further attempt made, after the failed coup of July 1944, to slow down Hitler’s resolve to continue the war?

4) Why were subsidiary Nazi leaders and military commanders prepared to follow him down to the absolute destruction of the Reich?

It was not that they wanted to follow him to personal oblivion. As soon as Hitler was dead, they did what they could to avoid the abyss. Almost all Nazi leaders fled, anxious not to follow Hitler’s example of self-immolation. Military commanders were now prepared to offer their partial capitulations in rapid succession, fighting on only to get as many of their men as possible into the western zones and away from the Red Army. Some harboured fantasies of being of future service to the western Allies.

On 2 May, German army units in Berlin surrendered. Over the ruined Reichstag building flew the red and gold hammer and sickle flag of the USSR. It had been improvised from a red tablecloth by a Red Army cameraman, the Ukrainian Jew Yevgenny Khaldei. The famous photograph of its raising on the building had later to be airbrushed to remove the – all too obviously looted – multiple wristwatches visible on the wrist of one of the young Red Army soldiers.

The destruction and humiliation of the Third Reich could hardly have been more strikingly staged. At 2.41 a.m. on Monday 7 May, the Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces High Command, General Alfred Jodl, on behalf of the new German government of Admiral Dönitz, surrendered unconditionally to the Western Allies at Rheims, France. Since no representative of the USSR was at this event, the surrender was repeated two days later in Berlin (backdated to 8 May).

The last fighting of the war is usually considered to have ended at about 4 p.m. on Tuesday 15 May when a mixed force of Croatian, Slovenian and Montenegrin allies of the Germans finally surrendered to Yugoslav partisans at Poljana, in Yugoslavia (now in modern Slovenia).

Historians have provided a persuasive analysis of why the Allies won and Hitler fell. Amongst the causes, the following have been corroborated by Kershaw in his book:

1) Germany was not sufficiently equipped for war in 1939, a situation made worse when it invaded the USSR. Most of its army was unmechanized and heavily dependent on horses; in 1942 alone some 400,000 were sent to the Eastern Front.

2) Over 90 per cent of the world’s oil resources were controlled by the Allies. Germany was also over-focused on developing new technologies when those it already had required updating.

3) The Western Allies destroyed the Luftwaffe through bombing aircraft factories and the oil industry; alongside deployment of long-range fighters, this meant that, between autumn 1943 and spring 1944, the Luftwaffe was starved of replacement planes and fuel and was shot out of the sky.

4) Crucially, Germany could not compete with the massive Allied commitment, organization and mobilization of resources, both human and technical.

Accordingly, by May 1945, the Third Reich was utterly ruined. It was to have lasted one thousand years; in the event it had lasted less than thirteen. In that time it had caused the deaths of about 40 million people, had committed genocide against the Jews and had enslaved millions. The Nazi New Order had caused misery beyond imagining but was finally over.

Finally ended was a world in which a German doctor at Auschwitz (in civilian life, Professor of Medicine at the University of Münster) could write the following in his diary: ‘6–7 September, 1942. Sunday, an excellent lunch: tomato soup, half a chicken with potatoes and red cabbage, petits fours, a marvellous vanilla ice cream. Left at eight in the evening for a special action [the mass killing of Jewish prisoners]

A tour de force of history by Kershaw!! Grab a copy if you choose.

[Goman Alexander · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ian is a good writer. A very good writer. It is very rare with the historians. But Ian is a very good writer.

[Erik Graff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Scott Magis had given me Kershaw's previously published book, 'Making Friends with Hitler', and I'd just read two other books about the last months of WWII in Europe, so this attempt to get at the reasons behind Germany's self destruction after the war was clearly lost caught my attention.

Kershaw begins his account with the assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944 and ends it with the final dissolution of the Reich government in late May, 1945--weeks after their capitulation. As might be expected, there is no simple answer to his initial question, that being why Germany didn't surrender earlier. Rather, he lists and documents a whole host of reasons, many of which pertain particularly to the character of the German nation after, at least, the defeat in 1918. Here, in my opinion, he's rather weak because of his rather small, 1944-45, canvas. Those well versed will be able to fill in the blanks certainly, but underemphasized is how very successful the Nazi regime was from 1933 until 1942, both domestically and internationally, both in peace and at war. Hitler's 'charisma', the leader-principle, and the party had proven themselves to ordinary citizens. The system had worked, spectacularly, pulling Germany out of depression and into the limelight as the most powerful European state. Beyond that it was, in part, inertia and the fear of reprisals, either by the apparatus of the German party and state or by the Soviets or the Jews whom they had so horrifically injured. Beyond that, it was the particular, the peculiar character of the German nation and its military establishment--i.e. the efficient fulfilment of 'duty' and, in the case of the military, of oaths--which allowed them to persist for so long beyond commonsense and rational self interest. Here, with what amounts to a question of social psychology, Kershaw does not dig very deeply--which might amount to me simply admitting that I find the answer to that question somewhat elusive and mysterious.

[Alan Draycott · Rating 2 out of 5]

A great disappointment. Two interesting questions made me buy the book- Why did the Germans carry on fighting when all was lost? Why did civillian life continue until the end? But Kershaw seemed to have found the answers almost immediatly and so told the story of the final year of the war instead- which he said he wouldn't. In itself that is a fine read but most will have already read it. So why did the Germans fight on?- simply Germans were afraid of the Bolsheviks either because they were in the party or because they believed the party line. They fought on the west because (well they could hardly not) and for some they wanted to change the allies mind and get them to help fight the Russians. Also everyone was afraid of Hitler though the book rarely explains why because Hitler seemed to leave the other political leaders almost entirely to their own devices and even the generals are rarely punished with more than a removal of post. A great tale but nothing new in this book. Stalingrad and Berlin are better reads if you want histroy of the eastern front, Alone in Berlin is a better book if you want to understand German civillian action.

[Brigitte · Rating 5 out of 5]

I love Ian Kershaw's writing because he takes what could be a very boring subject (military battles) and makes it readable for the layman. Most of you that know me, know that I lost a grandfather at the end of World War II (six weeks before it ended) and that our family doesn't exactly know what happened to him, although we have an idea that he may be buried in what is now Russia. He was in the German army, which is a sensitive subject for many, including myself. After reading this book, I have a much better understanding about how a nation followed a crazy man to the bitter end of that nation. It doesn't excuse what was done in Hitler's name, but Mr. Kershaw explained things so easily and completely that I will look for other books that he's written. The book also pointed me in other directions I can take to try and find out what my grandfather's last weeks were like and perhaps one day, I can put his entire story together - even if I may not like what I might find.

If you're a fan of World War II or need to recommend a WWII book to a patron, this is a good one to try.

[Shawn · Rating 3 out of 5]

He says in the preface that he's going to repeat himself often in this book, and he keeps his word! It's almost as though he doesn't expect us to read the whole thing and so uses this repetition to make certain that anyone choosing to read just a few of the chapters will still get a good grasp of his ideas as to why and how Germany was willing and able to maintain it's trajectory to total destruction right up to the end. But for this fault, I would have given it four stars. Read, by all means, but be prepared to do some judicious skimming!

[Antonio Papadourakis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Το βιβλίο περιγράφει αναλυτικά το τελευταίο έτος του πολέμου βάζοντας μάλλον σαν ορόσημο την απόπειρα δολοφονίας κατά του Χίτλερ από τον αντισυνταγματάρχη Στάουφενμπεργκ στις 20.7.1944.
Είναι μια ιστορία βίας, απελπισίας και καταστροφής για έναν ολόκληρο λαό που ουσιαστικά αναγκάστηκε να συνεχίσει ένα αδιέξοδο και χωρίς ελπίδα πόλεμο...
"Ο κύριος λόγος διατήρησης τους (δομών και νοοτροπιών) δεν ήταν η τυφλή πίστη στο πρόσωπο του Χίτλερ. Πιο σημαντική για τους Ναζί που καταλάμβαναν υψηλές θέσεις ήταν η αίσθηση ότι δεν είχαν μέλλον χωρίς τον Χίτλερ."
"Η παραγωγή της πολεμικής βιομηχανίας σε όλη τη διάρκεια του πολέμου είχε φθάσει στο ζενίθ της τον Ιούλιο του 1944. Το επίπεδο ωστόσο που επιτεύχθηκε ήταν παραπλανητικό. Έχει περιγραφεί πολύ πετυχημένα ως παρόμοιο με την τελευταία επιτάχυνση του μαραθωνοδρόμου πριν αυτός καταρρεύσει εξουθενωμένος.... Η Γερμανία γινόταν όλο και περισσότερο μια ατομικιστική, πειθαναγκασμένη κοινωνία που λειτουργούσε υπό το κράτος του φόβου. Επίσης, στο στάδιο αυτό ήταν πλέον μια πλήρως στρατικοποιημένη κοινωνία."
"Όποια και να ήταν η αξία της οχυρωματικής εκστρατείας που διαφήμιζε η προπαγάνδα, επισκιάστηκε από την αντικειμενική της λειτουργία που ήταν να δώσει ακόμα ένα μέσο ελέγχου του πληθυσμού."
"Όλες οι ελπίδες της γερμανικής ηγεσίας είχαν πλέον επενδυθεί στη μεγάλη επίθεση στη δύση. Αν ήταν επιτυχής, πίστευαν, θα μπορούσε να αποδειχθεί ένα αποφασιστικό σημείο αλλαγής της πορεία του πολέμου. Αν αποτύγχανε, κατ' ουσίαν ο πόλεμος θα είχε χαθεί. Αν όμως η χώρα περιοριζόταν σε μια στάση άμυνας, αυτό θα σήμαινε απλώς ότι στο τέλος θα συνθλιβόταν από τις συμμαχικές δυνάμεις που προήλαυναν από τα ανατολικά και τα δυτικά.... 'Συχνά οι πόλεμοι κρίνονται', ισχυρίστηκε ο Χίτλερ, 'από τη συνειδητοποίηση της μιας πλευράς ότι δεν μπορεί να κερδίσει πλέον τον πόλεμο. Γι' αυτό και το πιο σημαντικό καθήκον μας είναι να κάνουμε τον εχθρό να συνειδητοποιήσει ακριβώς αυτό.' "
"Ακόμα και όταν η αίσθηση ότι ο πόλεμος είχε χαθεί ανεπανόρθωτα ήταν πια διάχυτη, η ανησυχία γι' αυτό που θα έφερνε η ήττα επέτεινε την απελπισία της άρνησης υποχώρησης."
"Το στρατιωτικό κατεστημένο, αντίθετα με τους κατοπινούς ισχυρισμούς του, παρέμενε αφοσιωμένο στον Χίτλερ και σε μια στρατηγική η οποία, έχοντας αποκλείσει οποιαδήποτε μορφή συνθηκολόγησης, λογικά μπορούσε να οδηγήσει μόνο στη συνέχιση της φοβερής αιματοχυσίας και στην απόλυτη καταστροφή."
"Φυσικά η καταπίεση και η καταστολή ήταν δομικά στοιχεία του ναζιστικού καθεστώτος εξαρχής. Ο νομικός κάδος είχε συνεργασθεί πλήρως στις κλιμακούμενες διώξεις... Όμως η καταπίεση της προπολεμικής περιόδου, όσο κι αν ήταν πανταχού παρούσα, ήταν επικεντρωμένη σε 'ξένες' ομάδες... όσο η καταπίεση είχε στόχο τους 'ξένους' και τους 'ανεπιθύμητους', ήταν αποδεκτή, ίσως και ευπρόσδεκτη, από την πλειονότητα του λαού.... Καθώς οι απώλειες στο μέτωπο αυξανόταν επικίνδυνα και η πίεση στον άμαχο πληθυσμό μέσα στη Γερμανία κλιμακωνόταν αντίστοιχα στη διάρκεια του 1944, το καθεστώς έδειχνε όλο και μεγαλύτερη ευαισθησία σε σημάδια διαφωνίας... Όσο η προπαγάνδα αποτύγχανε, η βία εντεινόταν."

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 4 out of 5]

The End is a meticulous survey of the collapse of Nazi Germany, from the July Plot on Hitler's life to the final surrender.

There's not much variation in what happens. The military situation lurches from bad to worse against the implacable weight of the Red Army, the Allied bombing campaign, and the invasion in the west. Hitler sought an increasingly delusional victory, based on superweapons, the volkssturm militia, and a heroic mobilization of an exhausted population. Many senior leaders, both Nazi Party members and the "apolitical" generals and bureaucrats who had no problems with fascism, knew that the war was lost but were too scared to do anything to shorten it. And ordinary people, both civilian and military, did their best to survive under increasingly bad conditions.

As the war closes in on it's end, faith in the Nazi Party and Hitler collapse. True believers carried out punitive executions against deserters and traitors, while concentration camp victims were sent on purposeless death marches across Europe. Even so, German soldiers kept fighting, motivated by terror of reprisals under Soviet occupation, fear of their leaders, and a kind of bloody-minded obstinance.

This is a long, ugly book, and deeply researched, but I'm not sure any words can capture those final months of collapse.

[Daniel · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ian Kershaw provides a balanced, empathetic account of the end of Nazi Germany. One point that is particularly interesting is that while Nazi Germany was always authoritarian, and Adolf Hitler's regime lacked any checks and balances on his personal power, it did not become functionally totalitarian until near the end of the war. Joseph Goebbels' policy of total war even saw him attempt to ban sweets, though Hitler overruled him on that one!

The more that you read into World War II, the more you realise that it was anything but black and white. You also realise that no one comes out of it smelling of roses. As bad as the Nazis were, what was done to the German people by the Allies cannot be defended either.

[Maide Karzaoğlu · Rating 5 out of 5]

Bu kitap o kadar iyi bir kitap ki, o kadar olur.

Almanya’nın çöküşünü an an anlatıyor ve her açıdan anlatıyor. Kershaw bu anlamda %100 objektif bir yazar değil ama açıkçası bunu aramadım da. Her anlamda çok etkileyici bu kitapta beni en büyük şoka uğratan şey şu oldu:

Mahşer’in dört atlısı denilebilecek, Hitler’in en büyük 4 bakanı, Hitler’in yeni oluşturduğu bir mareşal unvanı için birbirinin kuyusunu kazıp nasıl yükselecekleri ile ilgili planlar yapıyor ve bunun için kendi halklarını kelimenin tam anlamıyla perişan ediyor. İnanılmaz! Dünyayı kasıp kavuran, Avrupa’ya dair her şeyi mahvetmiş bir ülkenin en önemli bakanlarından birisiniz ve bu “başarı (!)” ile tatmin olmaktansa yeni bir mevkinin hırsı bütün benliğinizi ele geçiriyor. Hitler o dönem bu hırsı tetiklemek için farklı kademeler oluşturmaya devam ediyor vs vs...

Askeri psikoloji derslerinde okutulsa diyeceğim dünya kadar hırs, ego, ölüm içgüdüsü, şiddet, insanın özüne dair her şey…

[Marián Tabakovič · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dôstojné zakončenie apokalyptického literárneho roku, od januára si už budem dávkovať pozitívnejšie veci.

Koniec Tretej ríše bol ešte väčšie peklo, ako si myslíte. Autor ukazuje, ako žili v poslednom roku vojny obyčajní Nemci, väzni v táboroch, členovia NSDAP aj ríšske elity a ako sa postupne zhoršovala ich situácia. Niektoré časti (nemmersdorfský masaker) nie sú pre slabšie povahy.

Spravme všetko, aby sa k nám veľká vojna nevrátila, lebo to ozaj nechcete.