Kindle Notes & Highlights
So, while realists would agree that there are important differences between moral facts and prosaic descriptive facts such as that the number 2 is the smallest prime, they would also hold that they have this much in common: facts of both kinds are mind-independent in an important sense, for facts of neither sort are recognition-variant or recognition-dependent. It is this last claim that distinguishes moral realism from that family of positions commonly labeled “constructivism.” For constructivists hold that moral facts are akin to what I have called prosaic normative facts, claiming that they
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“Multipliers,” such as myself, maintain that when I utter the sentence “Hume is the greatest modern philosopher” I have performed several act-tokens—in the case I offered, at least three. “Unifiers,” such as those who follow Donald Davidson, maintain that when I utter this sentence I have performed only one act-token that falls under several different descriptions or act-types. 19 As I say, I shall conduct my discussion as if the multiplier view were true. But I am willing to be ecumenical on the issue of act-individuation. Nearly everything I say about speech acts, I believe, can be
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Typically, when speech occurs, agents perform multiple act-tokens, albeit of the type in which multipliers are interested. With this in mind, let us return to the case in which I utter the sentence “Hume is the greatest modern philosopher.” Following Austin’s lead, I will call the event of uttering this sentence a locutionary act. As an initial approximation, locutionary acts are acts of uttering or inscribing sentences (or sentence surrogates). But it is worth emphasizing that the class of locutionary acts is actually much wider than this: sending smoke signals, tapping out patterns of
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Finally, I will call the act of delighting my colleagues a perlocutionary act. Roughly speaking, acts of this type ordinarily consist in producing an effect on one’s audience (usually a mental state) by way of the performance of an illocutionary act. Examples of such acts would be evoking delight, dismay, or puzzlement in one’s audience.
Fundamental to my discussion is the assumption that acts of these types come in a hierarchy. One performs an illocutionary act by way of performing a locutionary act. Likewise, one typically performs a perlocutionary act by way of the performance of an illocutionary act.
Suppose we use the term “generate” to stand for the generic relation of bringing something about or making something the case, where this relation is not causal. Examples of such a relation are not difficult to find. When Socrates was executed—to use a standard case—Xanthippe simultaneously became a widow. But presumably Socrates’ execution did not simultaneously cause Xanthippe to become a widow. There is no causal law, for example, which specifies that executions simultaneously cause people to become widows. If so, the execution of Socrates non-causally generated the state of affairs in
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Let us use the phrase “count as” to stand for the phenomenon of something’s falling under a concept but not simply in virtue of its intrinsic or essential characteristics. For example, in the game of baseball, a hit ball that clears the outfield fence in fair territory—what we can call an H-event—counts as a home run. But H-events do not fall under the concept ‘home run’ simply in virtue of their intrinsic or essential characteristics. They count as home runs only (and also) because, at the time of their performance, certain rules of baseball are in effect.
With these two pieces of terminology in hand, we can define the notion of count-generation (as it applies to actions) as follows: an agent’s performing an action Φ count-generates his performing an action Ψ just in case his Φing generates his Ψing and his Φing counts as his Ψing (at least in part) in virtue of his Φing.
it is your uttering the sentence “Hume is the greatest modern philosopher” that count-generates your having asserted that Hume is the greatest modern philosopher. However, as I indicated earlier—and will defend later—when acts count-generate other acts (or events), they always do so in virtue of there being certain conditions that hold at the time of the performance of those acts. These conditions are what explain the “hook-up” between count-generating acts, on the one hand, and count-generated acts (or events), on the other. Central to the argument I offer is the thesis that these conditions
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I will speak of an agent’s having rights, responsibilities, and obligations as being ingredient in the count-generation of speech. But by this I simply mean that having these rights, responsibilities, and obligations is (at least in part) that in virtue of which a locutionary act count-generates an illocutionary act.
when driving, you flip your blinker to the down-position, thereby signaling a left turn. In this case, your flipping your blinker count-generates your signaling in virtue of there being certain conditions that hold, such as there being certain rules of the road that are in effect.
(I use the term “pro tanto” in much the same way that others use the term “prima facie.” Pro tanto obligations are, for example, considerations that, in the absence of countervailing considerations, yield all-things-considered duties.)
Consider rights to begin with. Unless the context indicates otherwise, I will think of rights as claims or entitlements. More specifically, I will assume that for A to have a right against B is for A to have a claim against B to B’s treating A in a certain way, such as not restricting A’s freedom to move his body or to express his views. If this is correct, then rights are not identical with obligations. For obligations are not claims or entitlements; they are requirements. In fact, they are often requirements to honor rights.
In another sense, however, responsibilities are not reasons or obligations but liabilities. This sense of “responsibility” is expressed in phrases of the form S is responsible for Φing or S is responsible for having Φed. To stay with the example just offered, we might say that I am responsible for having failed to update the family photograph album. By this we mean that I am accountable or rightfully open to correction, reproach, blame, or the like for having failed to update the album.
(1) Agents perform illocutionary acts such as asserting, promising, and commanding. (2) Illocutionary acts are count-generated by locutionary acts. But locutionary acts are not sufficient for the count-generation to occur; there must be something else that explains why it occurs. (3) It is an agent’s having the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of being a speaker that explains (at least in part) why the count-generation of illocutionary acts occurs. (4) So, agents have the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of being a speaker. (5) If an agent has the rights, responsibilities,
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for an agent to perform an illocutionary act by way of performing a locutionary act, he must alter his normative position with respect to his audience, this alteration consisting in the fact that he acquires certain rights, responsibilities, and obligations vis-à-vis his audience, and vice versa.
First, when normative theorists claim that normative features are ingredient in the count-generation of speech acts, they do not thereby commit themselves to any claims about that in which these features consist. Strictly speaking, then, their view is compatible with these normative features being determined by anything from social stipulations to the commands of God. Nor do normative theorists commit themselves to any claims about the normative category to which these features belong. The normative theory, then, does not presuppose that these features are moral or should be understood as
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Suppose we want to know how an agent can acquire the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of being a speaker, thereby engaging in speech. Normative theorists answer: there must be an arrangement in effect for that agent such that she can employ it to acquire the normative standing of being a speaker. As such, conventional arrangements are vehicles for the acquisition of the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of being a speaker. Now, suppose somewhat differently, with respect to some arrangement for speaking, {Φing, Ψing}, we want to know what accounts for the fact that an agent’s
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All of us are familiar with cases in which an agent performs one and the same locutionary action but thereby performs very different types of action.
If we want to know why the performance of the same locutionary act-type generates a speech act in one case but not in another, the answer is that in one case an agent acquires the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of being a speaker by performing that locutionary act, while in the other case he does not. (This is not, I might add, to claim that illocutionary act-types can be individuated solely by appeal to their normative features.)
If you present things as being a certain way and things are not as you present them, then (in ordinary conditions) your audience has the right to correct, admonish, or blame you.
“What brings it about that a locutionary act count-generates an illocutionary act?” the normative theorist replies “In part, having the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of being a speaker.” In this respect, promises and commands do not stand apart as unusual speech acts, because they exhibit a normative dimension. All speech acts exhibit a similar normative dimension.
Normative theorists acknowledge the presence of perlocutionary intentions in speech; they deny, however, that they play a pivotal role in the count-generation of speech. Perlocutionary-intention theorists, by contrast, acknowledge the presence of normative features in speech, but deny that they play a pivotal role in the count-generation of speech. According to perlocutionary-intention theorists, it is not having the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of being speaker but the expression of perlocutionary intentions that accounts for the hook-up between locutionary and illocutionary
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Consider epiphenomenalists about the mind. Those who advocate this position claim that mental states such as beliefs and desires exist. They deny, however, that they explain anything worth explaining, such as an agent’s behavior. In general, this is because they hold that, although there are entities such as beliefs, appeal to them is explanatorily unnecessary. According to some epiphenomenalists, we can explain behavior adequately without making essential reference to beliefs. Usually, the claim is that behavior can be explained merely by appeal to neural or brain states (where these are not
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Suppose we could identify cases in which an agent performs a speech act, but fails to express (or, indeed, have) the requisite perlocutionary act intentions. If we could do this, then we would have strong reason to reject the claim that an agent’s expressing a perlocutionary act intention accounts for the generation of speech.
Imagine a deeply pessimistic prophet. God, we may imagine, has told this prophet to testify to a certain truth p. Given the prophet’s background knowledge of what his audience is like, he has no hope that they will engage with what he says; he is certain that they will simply ignore him. So, he forms no intention for his audience to engage with the content of what he says. Indeed, his view of the religious and moral character of his audience is so dim that he does not even form the intention to try to get them to engage with the content of what he says. Nonetheless, he wishes to be obedient to
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The point of the counterexamples is not that perlocutionary or communicative intentions are generally absent from speech. Nor is it that speech itself lacks a communicative dimension. The point, rather, is that perlocutionary intentions do not play the explanatory role that perlocutionary-intention theorists believe.
